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 POSTED WORKERS IN THE EU: 
LOST BETWEEN CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
AND SINGLE MARKET OBJECTIVES
Filip Bjelinski and Karla ŽeravËiÊ *
Abstract: Over the course of twenty years, the practice of the tempo-
rary posting of workers from one Member State to another where the 
said workers do not integrate into the host country’s labour market 
has become a widely discussed topic in the European Union that cre-
ates a split between its Member States. The paper considers the issue 
of posted workers within the EU, approaching it from the perspective 
of law, as well as politics. Through critical analysis of EU case law 
and legal documents, the authors identify an issue that goes well be-
yond the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, given that 
within each country there are different beliefs about the appropriate 
level of state (or EU) intervention in the market regarding the posting of 
workers. In order to prove this hypothesis, the authors use Croatia as 
a case study, where interviews were conducted with Croatia’s most 
prominent opposing poles regarding this issue. Finally, the authors 
give a fi nal evaluation of the issue at hand and underline the timeless 
confl ict between workers’ rights and business competitiveness. 
Keywords: posted workers, European Union, EU single market, work-
ers’ rights, yellow card procedure.
‘The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’.
(Article 26 TFEU)
1 Introduction
From its early years, the European Union, then known as the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, dreamed of an internal market within its 
borders where goods, services, capital and people could move freely and 
where the necessary balance between economic, social and environmen-
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tal policies would be maintained.1 The value that the market freedoms 
have for the EU shows in the fact that they are enshrined in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU).2 With the 
establishment of the Eurozone in 19993 and the Schengen agreement in 
1985,4 later incorporated within the Treaty framework, this promising 
dream was one step closer to becoming a functioning reality.
Nonetheless, over the last two decades, as its borders have grown, 
so has a wave of fear and self-interest. Politicians across the Union have 
used one of the most fundamental emotions, which rely on real concerns 
− fear (of losing a job, of losing identity) − in order to gain political power. 
‘The Polish plumber’ was just one of the names given to workers coming 
from the eastern part of the Union. This reference represents cheap la-
bour ‘threatening’ the jobs of Westerners. The phrase gained popularity 
after de Villiers, a French politician, used it in an effort to campaign 
against an EU law from 2004 that made free movement easier for work-
ers all across the Union.5 ‘The Polish plumber’ is seen as such a threat 
that it was also used in the debates leading to the Brexit referendum.6 
The practices associated with the cross-border provision of services, seen 
as unfair and illegal by the ‘old’ Member States, are viewed by the ‘new’ 
Member States as the only way to be able to compete in the single market. 
Even though ‘old’ Europe fears the cheaper Eastern European workforce, 
it seems that countries and regions in the geographical centre of Europe 
enjoy the strongest per capita gains from the single market and benefi t 
much more than EU members in the south or east of the continent.7 In 
other words, not everyone profi ts equally from the single market. 
1 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Threats and Obstacles to the 
Single Market’ (own-initiated opinion) rapporteur: Oliver Ropke (2016) <www.eesc.euro-
pa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/threats-and-obstacles-sin-
gle-market-own-initiative-opinion> accessed 23 November 2020 1-2.
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/01, Art 26 (TFEU).
3 European Commission, ‘What Is the Euro Area?’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-econ-
omy-euro/euro-area/what-euro-area_en#relatedlinks> accessed 23 November 2020.
4 ‘Schengen Agreement’ (Schengen visa info, 1 October 2019) <www.schengenvisainfo.com/
schengen-agreement/> accessed 10 May 2020.
5 Béatrice Houchard, ‘Comment le plombier polonaise a fait voter “non” au referendum 
de 2005’ (L’Opinion, 28 October 2013) <www.lopinion.fr/edition/politique/comment-plom-
bier-polonais-a-fait-voter-non-referendum-2005-5531> accessed 23 November 2020.
6 Lauren Frayer, ‘If Britain Leaves the EU, What Happens to the “Polish Plumber”?’ (NPR, 14 
May 2016) <www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/14/477685487/if-britain-leaves-
the-eu-what-happens-to-the-polish-plumber?t=1581279346169> accessed 23 November 
2020.
7 Katharina Gnath, ‘EU Single Market Boosts Per Capita Incomes by Almost 1,000 Euros 
a Year’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 8 May 2019) <www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/lat-
est-news/2019/may/eu-single-market-boosts-per-capita-incomes-by-almost-1000-euros-
a-year/> accessed 23 November 2020.
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One area where these differences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
Member States or the ‘richer’ and the ‘poorer’ Europe are visible is the 
area of posted workers. This paper aims to present possible reasons for 
tensions in this area and to assess whether the new legislative solution − 
the new Posted Workers Directive − which came into force in July 2020, 
could solve the problem. 
A ‘posted worker’ is an employee who is, temporarily, sent by his 
employer to carry out a service in another EU Member State that differs 
from the state in which he normally works, ‘in the context of a contract 
of services, an intra-group posting or a hiring out through a temporary 
agency’.8 What makes posted workers different from EU mobile workers 
is that, since they remain in the host Member State only temporari-
ly, they do not integrate into its labour market.9 These workers (about 
2.8 million) make up less than 1% of the entire workforce on the EU 
market.10 However, the annual increase in this practice,11 as well as the 
psychological impact it has had on EU citizens, makes it one of the most 
controversial topics in today’s European Union.
The usual explanation of the posted workers saga is that differenc-
es in the interests of low- and high-wage countries have led to disputes 
and legislative changes concerning posted workers. However, this, in our 
opinion, is a very one-sided point of view. The problem, we believe, is 
much more complicated.  
The aim of the paper is, therefore, to discover the underlying reasons 
for these tensions. We expect to fi nd that the posted worker problem does 
not, or does not only, arise from the gap between low- versus high-wage 
countries. The main reason for such a primary hypothesis is that, in our 
opinion, the entire problem of posted workers cannot be solely explained 
by the opposing interests of different countries, as the interests of differ-
ent actors within each country also differ. In order to test this hypothe-
sis, we will use Croatia as a test case. We expect to fi nd, ultimately, that 
the discrepancy of interests within each country expressed as different 
actors’ beliefs about the appropriate level of state (or EU) intervention in 
the market is an essential factor in the posted workers area, in addition 
to the reality of differences in wealth among EU countries.
8 European Commission, ‘Posted Workers’ <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?-
catId=471> accessed 23 November 2020.
9 ibid.
10 Frederic De Wispelaere and Jozef Pacolet, ‘Posting of Workers: Report on A1 Portable 
Documents Issued in 2017’ (2018) European Commission − DG EMPL Brussels 9 <www.
etk.fi /wp-content/uploads/Komissio-tilastoraportti-Posting-of-workers-2017.pdf>.
11 Statistics show that between 2010 and 2017, the number of posted workers increased by 
83%. See Case C-620/18 Hungary v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2020:1, Opinion of 
AG Sánchez-Bordona.
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Our second research question is whether the newly adopted solution 
(the amended Posted Workers Directive) will respond adequately to the 
current issues of posting. We expect to show that the changes in regula-
tion that are taking place will, in practice, reduce the number of posted 
workers. This, we believe, is a result that is not in line with the objectives 
of the single market.
As a means to prove our hypotheses, we will use a qualitative analy-
sis. Such analysis aims to extrapolate various, as expected, opposing ar-
guments that have been used during different stages of the posted work-
ers debate and classify them appropriately to prove (or disprove) that the 
arguments are not exclusively those defending the positions from the 
point of view of lower- or higher-wage countries. We will approach the 
problem of posted workers from the angle of law, as well as politics. This 
research is based on relevant legal documents (the old and new Direc-
tive), but also encompasses other documents by means of which the po-
sitions of the countries and the EU institutions (primarily the European 
Commission) were declared during the legislative process leading to the 
amended Directive. The debate on appropriate regulation not only took 
place in the legislative procedure at the EU level but also in cases which 
reached the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: ECJ). 
We will therefore also analyse the ECJ case law to understand the argu-
ments underlying the posted worker disputes. The other reason for such 
analysis will be to fi nd out how the existing legislation was interpreted, 
as its consequences can only be understood in this way. The research 
will be backed by the insights of scholars published in academic journals 
and books. 
In addition to using already existing data, we conducted a case 
study, using Croatia as a case model. For this purpose, and to verify 
our thesis that the problem is more complex than that of a confl ict be-
tween high- and low-wage countries, we conducted a semi-structured 
interview12 with two of Croatia’s prominent actors in the posted workers 
decision-making process: the Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Cro-
atia (UATUC) and the Employers’ Association. We expect that these will 
show that different positions concerning posted workers exist within the 
country and not only between countries. The conclusions drawn from 
the conducted interviews will be presented in section 5 of this paper.13
12 Semi-structured interviews provide a more in-depth understanding of participants’ per-
ceptions, which is why they were chosen here as a method for conducting the interviews.
13 The transcripts of the interviews themselves will be made available by the authors upon 
request. While choosing a method that would best suit our research in demonstrating Cro-
atia’s perspectives in the given issue, we conducted an informal conversation with Ms Tat-
jana Briški, member of the Committee on European Affairs of the Croatian Parliament 
during the yellow card procedure in 2016, who participated in this process. Additionally, we 
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The paper is structured as follows. After we set the scene in section 
2, the authors will describe the legislation, which currently regulates 
posted workers, as well as the case law that has interpreted it.14 Section 
3 explains the political tensions in the posted workers area, especially 
as they have developed after the Laval decision of the ECJ. In order to 
provide greater insight into the problem of posting, section 3 will also 
present economic fi ndings related to the difference in wages between lo-
cal and posted workers. The mentioned tensions resulted in the adoption 
of a new Directive. Section 4 explains the changes that the new Directive 
introduces. The new Directive was adopted with great resistance, not 
only during the process of its adoption but also afterwards. Section 4 
therefore deals with the challenges to the new regulation. 
In section 5, we present the results of our case study conducted in 
Croatia, based on the interviews with the representatives of the two op-
posing poles: the Employers’ Association and UATUC. Their arguments 
for and against the new legislation will be presented in that section. This 
will lead to the concluding section in which we elaborate how our fi nd-
ings refl ect the starting position − that the cause of the posted workers 
problem is not only based on high- versus low-wage countries, but is also 
an ideological issue.
2 Posting of workers as a service 
In 2017, there were 2.8 million people sent by their employers to 
carry out a service in another EU Member State on a temporary ba-
sis.15 These employees are also known as posted workers. Even though 
they make up less than 1% of the entire EU workforce, they constitute 
a signifi cant percentage in sectors such as construction.16 With 86% of 
workers being posted to the EU-15,17 Member States such as Germany, 
France, and Belgium receive the most signifi cant share.18 Despite their 
relatively low number,19 posted workers have become a symbol of social 
discussed the best method for conducting a case study and the way to format our interviews 
most appropriately with Professor Ksenija Grubiši , Associate Professor in the Department 
of Sociology, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb.
14 The research in this paper is based on relevant legislation and case law as it stood on 10 
November 2020.
15 De Wispelaere and Pacolet (n 10) 9.
16 ibid, 10. As much as 47% of posting occurs in the construction sector.
17 The EU-15 represents the number of member countries in the EU prior to the accession 
of ten candidate countries in 2004.
18 Rebecca Zahn, ‘Revision of Posted Workers Directive: A Europeanisation Perspective’ 
(2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 187, 187.
19 For more information on the number of posted workers by country, see Roberto Pedersini 
and Massimo Pallini, ‘Posted Workers in the European Union’ (2010) European Foundation 
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dumping.20 Social dumping is defi ned as ‘the practice, undertaken by 
self-interested market participants of undermining or evading existing 
social regulations with the aim of gaining competitive advantage’.21 
The practice of posting workers was fi rst regulated in the 1990s, 
but early judgments of the Court of Justice in Manpower22 and Van der 
Vecht,23 as pointed out by Houwerzijl and Verschueren, show how this 
practice was already a phenomenon in the late 1960s and early 1970s.24 
Both of these cases tackled the issue of social security for migrant work-
ers posted in another Member State by their employers. As stated in 
Manpower, a posted worker ‘shall continue to be subject to the legisla-
tion of the former Member State as though he were still employed in its 
territory, provided that the anticipated duration of the work which he is 
to perform does not exceed 12 months […]’.25 Nevertheless, not until the 
1990s did posted workers become associated with social dumping where 
workers from low-wage Member States were sent to higher-wage Member 
States.26 
The groundbreaking judgment that set the course for future posted 
worker regulations was Rush Portuguesa27 decided in 1990. This case 
post-dated the accession of Portugal to the EU.28 Under the Accession 
Treaty with Portugal, for a duration of seven years, a transitional period 
was put forward to protect labour markets in the ‘old’ Member States due 
to ‘geographical proximity, income disparities, high unemployment and 
a tendency to migrate’ of nationals of the ‘new’ Member States (the new 
states then being Portugal and Spain).29 This meant that the free move-
ment of workers did not apply to Portugal immediately after it acceded to 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 7-12 <www.eurofound.europa.eu/
publications/report/2010/posted-workers-in-the-european-union> accessed 23 November 
2020; and De Wispelaere and Pacolet (n 10).
20 Mijke Houwezijl and Herwig Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of (Posted) Workers’ in Teun 
Jaspers, Frans Pennings and Saskia Peters (eds), European Labour Law (Intersentia 2019) 
47, 50.
21 Monika Kiss ‘Understanding Social Dumping in the European Union’ (2017) European 
Parliamentary Research Service <www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.htm-
l?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)599353> accessed 20 November 2020 1.
22 Case 35/70 SARL Manpower v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de Strasbourg 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:120.
23 Case 19/67 Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v JH van der Vecht ECLI:EU:C:1967:49.
24 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 77.
25 Manpower (n 22) para 9.
26 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 77.
27 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda v Offi ce national d’immigration ECLI:EU:123456789.
28 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 77.
29 Andrea GrgiÊ, ‘Posting of Workers within the Framework of Free Movement of Services in 
the European Union Law’ (Doctoral thesis, University of Zagreb 2016) 42.
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the EU. On the other hand, the Accession Treaty did not restrict the free 
movement of services in construction, as well as in other sectors.
2.1 Rush Portuguesa
Rush Portuguesa was a company governed by Portuguese law whose 
registered offi ce was in Portugal. It specialised in building and public 
works. Rush had won a contract in France and, to carry out the works, 
brought its Portuguese workforce from Portugal. After the French Labour 
Inspectorate carried out checks of the sites Rush was working on, it no-
tifi ed Rush of a decision to impose a fi ne for employing foreign workers 
without a permit, which breached the provisions of the French Labour 
Code. In order to have the fi ne annulled, Rush argued in court that this 
was not a case of the free movement of workers but rather of the free 
movement of services. Therefore, its workers could not be prohibited from 
working in France, even without a work permit. Based on the fact that 
‘such workers return to their country of origin after the completion of 
their work without at any time gaining access to the labour market of the 
host Member State’,30 the Court of Justice made a revolutionary ruling 
according to which the provisions on the free movement of workers do not 
apply to posted workers. Posted workers were placed within the freedom 
to provide services. Nevertheless, the Court also explained that 
Community law does not preclude the Member States from extending 
their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both 
sides of the industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily 
within their territory, no matter which country the employer is estab-
lished, nor does Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing 
those rules by appropriate means.31 
In other words, according to the ECJ, domestic labour law may be 
extended to posted workers. 
By determining that posted workers do not gain access to the labour 
market of the host Member State, the ECJ avoided judging on the rising 
confl ict between the Community goal of a border-free EU internal market 
and national interests related to border control aimed at keeping immi-
grants out.32 Therefore, a regulation was needed.
30 Portuguesa (n 27) para 15.
31 ibid, para 18.
32 Mijke Houwerijl, ‘European Union Law and Dutch Labour Law: The Employment Pro-
tection of Posted Temporary Services Workers’ (2006) Dutch Contribution to Theme 1 on 
‘Trade Liberalization and the Labour’, XVIII World Congress of Labour and Security Law, 
Paris (5-8 September 2006) 4.
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2.2 The 1996 Directive regulating posted workers
The fi rst EU legislation on posted workers was adopted in 1996. After 
six years of intense political debate, negotiations and amendments, the 
European Council and Parliament adopted the so-called Posted Workers 
Directive33 (hereinafter: 1996 PWD). The 1996 PWD, which was still in 
force until the end of July 2020 when it was replaced by new legislation, 
aimed to create a framework of rules for posted workers to avoid unfair 
competition and promote a true single services market. The ruling in 
Rush Portuguesa paved the way for the said legal framework.34
The 1996 PWD consists of nine provisions. However, we will analyse 
only the fi rst three since they are of greatest importance to our paper.35 
We will divide the given articles into two categories:
1. personal scope and defi nitions (Articles 1 and 2)
2. terms and conditions of employment for posted workers (Article 3).
2.2.1 Personal scope and defi nitions
The 1996 PWD defi nes ‘posted worker’ as: ‘[a] person who, for a lim-
ited time, carries out his or her work in the territory of an EU Member 
State other than the state in which he or she normally works’.36
An example of a posted worker would be: ‘A Polish national pipefi tter 
employed at a construction fi rm in Poland [who] is sent by his employer 
to work on a water treatment plant construction for a client in France. 
His part of the project is expected to take three months’.37
2.2.1.1 ‘Person’
While it is easy to associate a ‘posted worker’ as an EU citizen com-
ing from a low-wage state who is sent to work in a higher-wage state, the 
‘person’ referred to in this defi nition can include individuals employed in 
33 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1996] OJ 
L18/1 (Directive 96/71/EC).
34 ibid.
35 For a more detailed analysis of the 1996 PWD, see Andrea GrgiÊ, ‘Posting of Workers 
within the Framework of Free Movement of Services in the European Union Law’ (Doctoral 
thesis, University of Zagreb 2016) 92-149.
36 Directive 96/71/EC, Art 2(1).
37 Kent O’Neil, ‘Do I Have a “Posted Worker (Part II)”?’ (Newland Chase, 20 February 2019) 
<https://newlandchase.com/do-i-have-a-posted-worker-part-ii/> accessed 24 November 
2020.
103CYELP 16 [2020] 95-132
any European Economic Area (hereinafter: EEA) state or Switzerland38 
who is temporarily working in another EEA state or Switzerland.39
2.2.1.2 ‘For a limited time’
This is a controversial part of this defi nition that was neither solved 
nor clarifi ed by the Directive.40 The potentially unlimited duration of the 
posting falls on the borderline between the free movement of workers 
and the freedom to provide services.41 Over the years, the ECJ has come 
across cases42 where an interpretation of ‘limited period’ was needed. In 
Gebhard,43 the Court stated that ‘the temporary nature of the activities 
in question has to be determined in the light, not only of the duration of 
the provision of the service but also of its regularity, periodicity or con-
tinuity’.44 However, in the case Trojani,45 the ECJ held that an activity 
carried out on a permanent basis or without any foreseeable limit would 
not be considered a service within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU.46 The 
contrasting interpretation given by the Court was of no help in providing 
a practicable defi nition of ‘temporary’. 
This issue was solved by neither case law nor national legislation, 
until the enactment of the latest Directive on posted workers, which we 
will discuss later.
2.2.1.3 ‘Carries out his or her work’
The PWD covers three different types of posting, as described in 
Article 1(3):
a. posting to carry out service contracts in the context of transna-
tional subcontracting (eg in the construction sector)
38 See ‘Posting Workers to Switzerland’ (2019) MCH Group Ltd, Basel <www.mch-group.
com/en-US/venues/basel/messe-basel/organisers-regulations.aspx> accessed 20 Novem-
ber 2020.
39 Kent O’Neil, ‘Do I Have a “Posted Worker”?’ (Newland Chase, 20 February 2019) <https://
newlandchase.com/do-i-have-a-posted-worker/> accessed 24 November 2020.
40 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 89.
41 Houwezijl (n 32) 7.
42 Neither Gebhard nor Trojani was directly related to the topic of PW, although they still 
had a signifi cant impact on the interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive of 1996.
43 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano ECLI:EU:C:1995:411.
44 ibid, para 27.
45 Case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:488.
46 ibid, para 26.
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b. transnational intra-company transfers (eg the posting of key per-
sonnel)
c. transnational temporary agency work.47
2.2.1.4 ‘Other than the state in which he or she normally works’
As previously stated, the 1996 PWD applies to individuals whose 
usual place of work is within the borders of the EEA or Switzerland. 
However, some Member States, while adopting the Directive in their na-
tional legislation, have expanded their national requirements for posted 
worker notifi cations to include workers from a third country that are 
sent to the EU for temporary work.48
2.2.2 Terms and conditions 
Within Article 3, the 1996 PWD sets a base of mandatory labour 
standards that apply to the duration of work, rest periods and holidays, 
minimum rates of pay, health, safety and hygiene at work, protective 
measures for pregnant women, for women who have recently given birth, 
for young people and children, and the equal treatment of men and wom-
en.49 However, cases such as Laval, Commission v Luxemburg and Rüffert 
(which we will discuss later in the paper) made it clear that the Directive 
imposed not only a ‘fl oor’ but also a ‘ceiling’ concerning the application 
of host-state law.50 In other words, any demand going beyond the set 
minimum standards of Article 3(1) would result in the foreign service 
provider losing its competitive advantage, which meant that additional 
demands were never made since they fell outside the mandatory scope of 
the mentioned Article 3(1).51
While the Directive does state in Article 3(10) that the Member 
States may impose the application of terms and conditions wider than 
those listed within Article 3(1) for the sake of public policy, the ECJ in 
Commission v Luxemburg52 decided on a strict interpretation of the given 
Article.53 After this judgment, it became clear that the ‘concept of pub-
47 Directive 96/71/EC, Art 1(3).
48 O’Neil (n 39).
49 Directive 96/71/EC, Art 3(1).
50 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 83.
51 Daniel Carter, ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work in the Same Place? Assessing the Revision to 
the Posted Workers Directive’ (2018) 14 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 31, 
43.
52 Case C-473/93 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:263.
53 See: Carter (n 51) 40-41.
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lic policy comes into play only where a genuine and suffi ciently serious 
threat affects one of the fundamental interests of society and that it must 
be narrowly construed’.54 This confi rmed that the 1996 PWD, in reality, 
did impose a ‘ceiling’ on the application of the host-state law.
2.2.2.1 Rüffert
Trying to appease Denmark,55 the 1996 PWD in Article 3(1) allowed 
the Member States without a system for declaring collective agreements 
universally applicable to apply generally applicable agreements, or agree-
ments concluded by the most representative organisations.56 While Arti-
cle 3(8) gave a more in-depth insight into the previous Article, where, in 
order for a collective agreement to be considered universally applicable, 
it must be ‘observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in 
the profession or industry’.57 
Nevertheless, even with a greater insight provided by Article 3(8), 
an issue arose that resulted in the ECJ’s ruling in Rüffert.58 The issue 
at hand concerned Lower Saxony, which had a rule that obliged public 
authorities to award contract works only to undertakings paying wages 
laid down in the local collective agreement. However, the company that 
won the public tender contract only agreed to pay half of what was in the 
applicable collective agreement. With its ruling, the ECJ decided that the 
Lower Saxony collective agreement fell outside both paragraphs of Arti-
cle 3(8) as well as Article 3(1), stating that the collective agreement had 
not been declared universally applicable according to the Directive since 
Germany did, in fact, have a system for declaring collective agreements 
universally applicable.59 The Court also added that this agreement was 
not generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical 
area and the profession or industry concerned.60 With this decision, the 
ECJ narrowed the specifi c types of collective agreements that Article 3(1) 
applies to.61
54 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 83.
55 ibid, 82.
56 Directive 96/71/EC, Art 3(1).
57 ibid, Art 3(8).
58 Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen ECLI:EU:C:2008:189.
59 ibid, para 27.
60 ibid, para 28. 
61 Carter (n 51) 44.
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2.2.2.2 The favour principle
Another issue that arose was related to Article 3(7) in which it is 
stated that host labour standards only apply when working conditions 
in that Member State are more favourable than in the home state of 
the posted worker. This requires a comparison between host and home 
labour standards. This provision was added as a way of avoiding any 
drastic infringements to the freedom to provide services, as well as the 
freedom of contract, which an unconditional application of host state 
law would have done.62 However, since this so-called favour principle 
was never fully put into operation, the question of how it was to be de-
cided and which working conditions were the most favourable was not 
answered. 
In the preamble, the 1996 PWD declares its intention to promote the 
transnational provision of services, at the same time ensuring a climate 
of fair competition and guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers. 63 
This raises the question − did the Posted Workers Directive achieve its 
intention?
3 The Laval case and its consequences
Just ten years after the making of the Posted Worker Directive in 
1996, two ECJ rulings made an inevitable impact across the Union. The 
cases were the Laval64 case and the Viking65 case. Viking concerned the 
right of establishment, while Laval became the pivotal case for posted 
workers, which is why we shall discuss this case at greater length. For 
some, these rulings were seen as a ‘danger’ for social Europe and an 
opening for ‘wage dumping’ in the EU, while others saw them as crucial 
for preserving the freedom of movement and establishment throughout 
the internal market.66 As will be shown later, the mentioned cases creat-
ed a problematic interface between the two opposite stances. 
62 Houwezijl and Verschueren (n 20) 85.
63 Directive 96/71/EC Preamble, recital 5.
64 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Svens-
ka Byggnadsarbetareforbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerforbundet 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
65 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OU Viking Line Eesti ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
66 ‘European Social Model Challenged by Court Rulings’ (Euractiv, 27 February 2008) 
<www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/european-social-model-chal-
lenged-by-court-rulings/> accessed 17 November 2020.
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3.1 The Laval case
The Laval case concerned a Latvian company which, after having 
won a public tender in Sweden, posted there dozens of its workers. Esti-
mates suggest that these posted workers earned around 40% less than 
their Swedish counterparts.67 Fearing that the posting of cheap labour 
would threaten the position of Swedish construction workers, the Swed-
ish trade unions encouraged Laval to comply with the local terms and 
conditions of employment laid down by the collective agreement.68 How-
ever, these negotiations were unsuccessful, which resulted in the Swed-
ish trade unions taking collective actions by blocking all Laval working 
sites. In response, Laval brought the case to the Swedish Labour Court. 
The case was referred to the ECJ, where it was considered in the context 
and alongside the Viking case. The latter also concerned the lawfulness 
of industrial action, in this case boycotting, which had the effect of plac-
ing restrictions on the freedom to provide services.
The opinion given by the Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi in La-
val showed support for the Swedish trade unions’ position and was well 
received by the European trade unionists and their supporters.69 The 
central part of AG Mengozzi’s opinion was that the actions taken by the 
trade union did not compromise the legal provisions set out in the 1996 
PWD. He concluded his opinion by stating that the blocking of the Laval 
working site was acceptable as this was ‘motivated by public interest 
objectives, such as the protection of workers and the fi ght against social 
dumping, and is not carried out in a manner that is disproportionate to 
the attainment of those objectives’.70 If the preliminary ruling had com-
plied with the AG’s opinion, this would have been a major step for trade 
unions all over the EU: ‘This preliminary ruling could have represented 
an important precedent for other European trade unions to follow and 
an acknowledgment that trade unions’ organisational horizons were no 
longer governed by national borders’.71
67 Michael Whittall, ‘Unions Fear ECJ Ruling in Laval Case Could Lead to Social Dumping’ 
(Eurofound, 24 February 2008) <www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2008/
unions-fear-ecj-ruling-in-laval-case-could-lead-to-social-dumping> accessed 17 November 
2020.
68 It is important to note that Sweden (like Denmark) does not have a statutory minimum 
wage nor a scheme for the extension of collective agreements in accordance with the 1996 
PWD; for more information, see Melita CareviÊ, Paula Kiš and Filip Kuhta, ‘Minimum Wages 
as an Obstacle to the Free Provision of Services’ (2008) 4 Croatian Yearbook of European 
Law and Policy 75, 84-88.
69 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareforbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerforbundet 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:291, Opinion of AG Mengozzi.
70 ibid, para 307.
71 Whittall (n 67).
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However, the ECJ’s ruling did not mirror the opinion of AG Mengo-
zzi. The Court was of the opinion that the right to take collective action 
must be recognised as a fundamental right forming an integral part of 
the general principles of the Community law, stating that taking action 
against social dumping may, in fact, constitute a reason of public in-
terest. Nevertheless, the action taken did represent a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services and thus made the services ‘less attractive’.72 
In the related Viking case, the Court held that the trade unions’ right to 
take collective action might be limited by the employers’ rights to free-
dom of establishment.73
3.2 Political polarisation and the rise of populism 
As stated in the opening of this section, the reaction to these cases 
was quite polarised. The Secretary-General of the European Trade Union 
Confederation, for example, stated that ‘unions across Europe were now 
deeply concerned with defending their national systems’ and also added 
that there is a risk of a ‘protectionist reaction’.74 Additionally, many Mem-
bers of the European Parliament took stands on this issue. For example, 
the Danish MEP Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the Party of Eu-
ropean Socialists, said that the message that citizens of the EU might 
receive was that ‘Europe is more interested in the competition between 
workers than in raising living standards for all families’.75 On the other 
hand, there was MEP Philip Bushill-Matthews, employment spokesman 
for the UK Conservatives, who stated that ‘it is good to see the European 
Court of Justice upholding a key principle of the single market: the trade 
union movement should stop trying to block progress in this area but 
should learn from this judgment to move with the time’.76 According to 
BusinessEurope, a lobby group that represents enterprises of all sizes 
in the EU,77 the judgment would contribute to ‘improving the develop-
ment of an internal market’78 and provide ‘legal clarity, which was greatly 
needed to achieve the correct implementation of the posting of workers 
directive’.79
72 Laval (n 64) para 99.
73 Viking (n 65) paras 88-89.
74 ‘European Social Model Challenged by Court Rulings’ (n 66).
75 ‘Unions Frustrated at Court Ruling on Posted Workers’ (Euractiv, 28 February 2012) 
<www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/unions-frustrated-at-court-ruling-
on-posted-workers/> accessed 20 November 2020.
76 ibid.
77 ‘Confederation of European Business’ (Wikipedia, 15 April 2020) <https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Confederation_of_European_Business> accessed 20 November 2020.
78 ‘European Social Model Challenged by Court Rulings’ (n 66).
79 Whittall (n 67).
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As is apparent from comments made by people from different areas 
of expertise, such as those stated above, the issue that arises not only in 
an ECJ ruling but in the practice of posted workers in general is whether 
social rights, including workers’ rights, and an internal market without 
limits can be in harmony with each other or whether one will always 
come before the other.
Regardless of the stances taken on this matter, one cannot ignore 
the impacts it has had and will have on the future of the EU. Over the 
last two decades, populism and Euroscepticism have risen in all parts of 
the Union. Whether or not we believe that the intensity of policy compe-
tition and migration is exaggerated or unfounded, we still cannot deny 
that it has produced fear of a cumulative ‘race to the bottom’.80 
Today, one in three Europeans will cast their vote for a Euroscep-
tic party,81 which is believed to partially stem from outright rejection 
of European economic integration.82 The reasons behind this might be 
the lack of solutions for establishing common ground at the level of so-
cial protection between countries at different stages of economic devel-
opment, especially after the accession of Eastern European countries.83 
Even those who do not vote for a Eurosceptic party still wish for a more 
social Europe, which is evident from the rulings regarding the Posted 
Workers Directive that sparked social outrage.
3.3 A fi ght for a more ‘social Europe’
In the aftermath of the Laval case, the revision of the 1996 PWD 
was just one of many legislative ideas put forward by trade unions, com-
panies and the Member States to introduce fundamental social rights 
in the EU’s single market. As Belgian lorry drivers were protesting the 
‘stealing’ of their work in the transport sector by Eastern Europeans who 
80 ‘Race to the bottom’ is a situation where companies compete with each other to reduce 
costs by paying the lowest wages or giving workers worse conditions; ‘Race to the bottom’ 
(Cambridge Dictionary) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/race-to-the-
bottom> accessed 17 November 2020.
81 Eurasia Review, ‘Tracking the Rise of Euroscepticism and Support for the Far-Right’ 
(Eurasia Review News & Analysis, 3 March 2020) <www.eurasiareview.com/03032020-
tracking-the-rise-of-euroscepticism-and-support-for-the-far-right/> accessed 24 November 
2020.
82 Jon Henley, ‘Support for Eurosceptic Parties Doubles in Two Decades Across EU’ (The 
Guardian, 2 March 2020) <www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/support-for-euro-
sceptic-parties-doubles-two-decades-across-eu> accessed 24 November 2020.
83 Olaf Cramme, ‘Social Europe’s New Battleground’ (Euractiv, 22 March 2011) <www.eu-
ractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/social-europe-s-new-battleground/> ac-
cessed 24 November 2020.
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were working for lower wages and with poorer working conditions,84 the 
French were gathering allies across the EU in their fi ght against what 
they saw as social dumping.85 As expressed by a French senator, Eric 
Bocquet, during an interview with EURACTIV France, the difference be-
tween France and Poland in social contributions that employers pay in 
the country of origin can amount to 30%.86 This can result in employers 
deciding to hire a worker that would cost them much less in a wholly le-
gal and systematic way, but can also result in an increase in xenophobia 
among the local workers who feel that their jobs have been stolen from 
them. 
While countries like Belgium, Spain and to some extent Germany 
sided with France in wanting better control of the posted workers sys-
tem, pre-Brexit UK and the Eastern European countries were fi rmly op-
posed to it87 The Eastern European countries were declaring competition 
within the single market as their key counterargument, whereas in the 
UK, the then Prime Minister David Cameron used cheap labour workers 
as an argument to attract voters.88 However, Cameron was not the only 
politician using this ‘crisis’ to his advantage. Just south of its borders, 
France’s main far-right party, the Front National, led by Marine le Pen, 
was leading in the EU election polls which were just a few months away 
when all this was happening. 89 Even though posted workers make up 
less than 1% of the workforce, the psychological impact on voters was 
meaningful. Bearing this in mind, the French government started to 
push this issue forward at the European level. This consisted of ‘tight-
ening labour inspection controls in the affected sectors’, which they be-
lieved were increasingly bypassed, ‘preventing fraudulent arrangements 
and the strengthening of legislation’.90 In the end, the Council of the 
European Union, responding to political unease, gave initial approval to 
84 ‘Lorry Drivers Take Protests to Brussels on Monday’ (VRT NWS, 23 September 2012) 
<www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2012/09/23/lorry_drivers_takeproteststobrusselsonmon-
day-1-1437591/> accessed 24 November 2020.
85 Cécile Barbière, ‘France Looks for EU Allies in Fight against Low-Cost Workers’ (Euractiv, 
7 November 2013) <www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/france-looks-for-
eu-allies-in-fi ght-against-low-cost-workers/> accessed 24 November 2020.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 Aline Robert, ‘Paris Pushes EU-wide Minimum Wage in Crusade against Social Dumping’ 
(Euractiv, 2 December 2013) <www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/paris-push-
es-eu-wide-minimum-wage-in-crusade-against-social-dumping/> accessed 24 November 
2020.
89 Aline Robert, ‘French EU Minister Seeks Solutions to Fight Social Dumping’ (Euractiv, 
18 November 2013) <www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/french-eu-minister-
seeks-solutions-to-fi ght-social-dumping/> accessed 24 November 2020.
90 Robert (n 88).
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tighten the rules regarding posting with an enforcement directive, with-
out changing the provisions of the PWD. The aim of this Directive would 
have been to improve the supervision and enforcement of the rules of 
the 1996 PWD, with ‘national control measures and joint and several li-
abilities in subcontracting chains’.91 However, at the request of the UK,92 
these provisions were only to apply to the construction sector, which 
was a particular area of worry because of the great use of sub-contrac-
tors in the construction business that led to abuses of social law.93 The 
proposal aimed to end this abuse by allowing ‘posted workers to hold 
the contractor, of which the employer is a direct subcontractor, liable, in 
addition to or in place of the employer’ regarding their rights as worker, 
mainly consisting of ‘remuneration corresponding to the minimum rate 
of pay’.94
3.4 The Enforcement Directive 2014
On 15 May 2014, the EU adopted the Enforcement Directive95 that 
would be ‘updating and improving the way the single market works, 
while safeguarding workers’ rights’.96 The Enforcement Directive 2014 
(hereinafter: 2014 ED) is mainly the result of compromises between the 
states, those that were against and those supporting the strengthening 
of controls.97 Knowing that workers sent to another Member State ‘play 
an important role in fi lling labour and skill shortages in various sectors 
and regions like construction, agriculture and transport’,98 the goal of 
this Directive was to diminish fraud and abuse, such as that committed 
by companies that were artifi cially establishing themselves abroad to 
91 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Reaches General Approach on Posting of Work-
ers Directive’ Presse 562 (2013) <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/lsa/139997.pdf> accessed 24 November 2020 2.
92 ‘Labour Ministers Hammer out Agreement on Posted Workers’ (Euractiv, 10 Decem-
ber 2013) <www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/labour-ministers-ham-
mer-out-agreement-on-posted-workers/> accessed 24 November 2020.
93 ibid.
94 Council of the European Union (n 91) 1.
95 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 15 May 
2014 on the enforcement of the Directive 96/71/2012 concerning the posting of workers 
in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation [2014] OJ L159/11.
96 European Commission Press Release IP/12/267, ‘Commission to Boost Protection for 
Posted Workers’ (2012) < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
IP_12_267> accessed 24 November 2020 1.
97 Sébastien Richard, ‘The Implementing Directive on Posted Workers: And What Now?’ 
(Robert Schuman, 29 February 2016) <www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-is-
sues/0383-the-implementing-directive-on-posted-workers-and-what-now> accessed 24 
November 2020.
98 European Commission Press Release (n 96) 2.
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benefi t from lower levels of labour protection and lower levels of social 
security contributions99 also known as letterbox companies.
However, not long after its adoption, the new text brought criticism 
from, among others, France, arguing that it did not do enough in terms of 
protecting workers or preventing abuse.100 Consequently, France decided 
to take matters into its own hands, releasing the Macron bill to clamp 
down on the 300,000 illegally posted workers within the country.101 
However unsuccessful the 2014 ED seemed to be to some, this was 
only the fi rst step in an attempt to fi ght social dumping and fraud. The 
next phase was the revision of the 1996 PWD, causing a bipartisan reac-
tion among EU nationals. BusinessEurope argued that this step was not 
necessary since the 2014 ED, at the time, was still not fully implemented, 
and that ‘changing legislation would bring new uncertainty for business 
in Europe’.102 European small construction entrepreneurs counterar-
gued103 that the issues they were facing were not tackled by the 2014 ED, 
which is why, in their view, it was necessary to review the 1996 PWD to 
ensure a level playing fi eld for construction enterprises and to protect the 
rights of posted workers.104 
Two years after the 2014 ED and twenty years after the 1996 PWD, a 
new Directive was adopted. The growing number of posted workers in the 
EU, which had increased by nearly 45% between 2010 and 2014,105 was 
just one of the reasons that some countries, such as Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands, who also receive half of the work-
ers, pushed for this new Directive. 106
99 ibid.
100 Florence Dupont-Fargeaud and Camilla Spira, ‘New Directive on Posted Workers Ig-
nores Member States’ Objections’ (Euractiv, 16 April 2014) <www.euractiv.com/section/
social-europe-jobs/opinion/new-directive-on-posted-workers-ignores-member-states-ob-
jections/> accessed 24 November 2020.
101 Jean-Christophe Chanut, ‘Le diffi cle combat contre la fraude au détachement des sala-
ries étrangers’ (La Tribune, 11 June 2015) <www.latribune.fr/economie/france/le-diffi cile-
combat-contre-la-fraude-au-detachement-des-salaries-etrangers-483398.html> accessed 
24 November 2020.
102 Daniela Vincenti ‘Posted Workers Revision Gets off to Shaky Start’ (Euractiv, 9 March 
2016) <www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/posted-workers-revision-
gets-off-to-shaky-start/> accessed 24 November 2020.
103 ibid. 
104 Statement given by European Builders Confederation president, Patrick Liebus.
105 ‘La révision de la directive sur le détachement des travailleurs’ (Robert Schuman, 10 
October 2016) <www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0406-la-revision-de-la-
directive-sur-le-detachement-des-travailleurs> accessed 24 November 2020.
106 ibid.
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3.5 Why are posted workers more affordable?
As one of its unintended effects, the 1996 PWD set out a practice of 
preference for posted workers over domestic workers, with the main rea-
son being the difference in cost. Although employers are required to ap-
ply the mentioned terms and conditions set out by the 1996 PWD, fi rms 
still manage to obtain a cost advantage if social security contributions in 
the home state are considerably lower.107 According to a study by E Voss, 
‘labour cost differences from savings in terms of social security contri-
butions could be as much as 30%’.108 Furthermore, if a posted worker is 
not placed correctly at the appropriate skill or qualifi cation level, unlike 
his equally skilled colleague from the host country, he will be working on 
minimum pay and in poorer conditions. This, additionally, signifi es both 
down-skilling and possibly brain waste.109  
In practice, posted workers are often paid and even prepared to work 
at the lowest offi cial minimum wage, given that the pay is still much 
higher than the home country equivalent.110 A good example is a 2005 
UK case where Hungarian posted workers were being paid around GBP 
816 to 1,020 per month, which was below the standard rates and na-
tional minimum wage. As reported by a posted worker, in Hungary the 
equivalent wage would have been GBP 326.111 
Even France,112 whose posting regulation, in theory, provided ef-
fective equality of direct wage costs for posted and French workers,113 
reported in 2006 an estimated wage difference between foreign posted 
workers and their local workers to be around 50%.114 In Denmark, in the 
mid-2000s, a study of the construction sector reported that workers from 
107 Frederic De Wispelaere and Jozef Pacolet, ‘An ad hoc Statistical Analysis on Short Term 
Mobility − Economic Value of Posting of Workers: The Impact of Intra-EU Cross-Border 
Services, with Special Attention to the Construction Sector’ (2016) European Commission 
− DG EMPL Brussels 15.
108 Eckhard Voss (in cooperation with Michele Faioli, Jean-Philippe Lhernould and Feli-
ciano Iudicione), ‘Posting of Workers Directive: Current Situation and Challenges’ (2016) 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientifi c Policy <www.europarl.europa.eu/think-
tank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2016)579001> accessed 24 November 
2020 38.
109 Ninke Mussche, Vincent Corluy and Ive Marx, ‘How Posting Shapes a Hybrid Single 
European Labour Market’ (2017) 24(2) European Journal of Industrial Relations 113, 113.
110 De Wispelaere and Pacolet (n 107) 14.
111 Jan Cremers, In Search of Cheap Labour in Europe: Working and Living Conditions of 
Posted Workers (CLR Studies 2011) 41.
112 ibid, 39.
113 Where each worker is paid according to the (minimum) gross wage corresponding to the 
rates of his qualifi cation fi xed by a collective agreement.
114 Voss (n 108) 37.
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Eastern European countries were being paid on average 25-28% less 
than their Danish counterparts.115 
To further demonstrate the cost difference between local and post-
ed workers,116 we will use a table created by E Voss, which provides an 
‘approximate illustration of the cost savings that are achieved through 
posting’. This example uses three fi ctive workers from the Netherlands, 
Poland and Portugal and uses the assumption that income tax is paid in 
the host state where, in fact, in most situations, this is not the case. The 
reason being the ‘183 days rule’ which stipulates that the posted worker 
will be subject to income tax in the home state if they work fewer than 
183 days within a period of 12 months in the host state. Hence, since 
most postings do not last more than 183 days, the home country usually 
levies the income tax. Therefore, the cost savings can be even higher in 
most cases, given that there are signifi cant differences in the income tax 
level in each Member State.






Net salary 1,600 1,600 1,600
-/- social security
(paid in the sending country)
496 81 350
-/- taxes
(paid in the receiving country, 
i.e. after the 183 days)
81 81 81
Gross salary 2,177 1,762 2,032
Percentage saving as 
compared to a Dutch worker
19.1% 6.7%
Source: Voss (n 108) 27.
As is evident from Table 1, there is a signifi cant percentage differ-
ence in costs between workers coming from different countries. This 
makes it even easier to understand why employers prefer posted work-
ers compared to domestic ones and also to understand why a new PWD 
came into being.
115 ibid.
116 For additional examples, see Roberto Pedersini and Massimo Pallini, ‘Posted Workers 
in the European Union’ (2010) European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions <www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2010/posted-work-
ers-in-the-european-union> accessed 24 November 2020 13.
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4 Resistance towards the 2018 PWD proposal
The new Posted Workers Directive 2018 was adopted on 21 June 
2018.117 This was a result of long negotiations.  The process of its creation 
was a challenge that stands as an example of evaluating the importance 
of confl icting interests, such as competitiveness on the one hand, and 
the suppression of social dumping and unfair competition on the other.118
4.1 The last line of defence − Hungary’s and Poland’s lawsuit
Even after its adoption, the challenge to the 2018 PWD continued. 
Hungary119 and Poland120 fi led lawsuits demanding its annulment. Al-
though the cases were still pending while this paper was written,121 AG 
M Campos Sanchez-Bordona published his opinion in which he gives 
a detailed answer to the arguments laid out by Hungary.122 While the 
AG’s opinion does not bind the ECJ, it still gives us a possible insight 
into the future actions of the Court regarding the fi led lawsuits. In its 
application, Poland expressed the view that the main objective of the 
2018 PWD was to restrict the freedom to provide services by increasing 
the burden on service providers, which would result in a reduction of 
competitiveness.123 It also considered that the provisions of the Directive 
were discriminatory and contrary to the principle of proportionality due 
to insuffi cient justifi cation.124
On the other hand, Hungary raises fi ve pleas in law, of which we 
will, for relevance to our study, examine only the fi rst three.125 Firstly, 
Hungary considers that the 2018 PWD is based on the wrong legal basis 
and should have been adopted on the basis of Article 153 TFEU, which 
117 European Council, ‘Posting of Workers: Council Adopts the Directive’ (European Council, 
21 June 2018) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/21/post-
ing-of-workers-council-adopts-the-directive/> accessed 24 November 2020.
118 ‘UpuÊivanje radnika u okviru pružanja usluga’ [‘Posting of Workers within the Provision of 
Services’] (2016) Croatian Parliament, European Affairs Committee (document on fi le with 
the authors) 2.
119 Case C-620/18 Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
ECLI:EU:2020:1001.
120 Case C-626/18 Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union ECLI:EU:2020:1000.
121 As of 8 December 2020, the actions taken by Hungary and Poland are no longer pending 
since the ECJ dismissed both of the lawsuits.
122 Case C-620/18 Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
ECLI:EU:2020:1, Opinion of AG Sánchez-Bordona.
123 Republic of Poland v European Parliament (n 120) para 3.
124 ibid.
125 For the other two pleas, see Case C-620/18 Hungary v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union ECLI:EU:2020:1001.
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deals with certain aspects of the EU’s social policy.126 The AG disagreed, 
pointing out that an act amending another earlier act generally has the 
same legal basis as the latter.127 Secondly, Hungary considers that the 
Union has no legislative power to regulate the issue of remuneration in 
the fi eld of labour relations.128 AG Sanchez-Bordona refuted this argu-
ment, stating that the EU only harmonises the application of the rules of 
operation of the host country and country of origin.129 
Additionally, AG Sanchez-Bordona stated that the 2018 PWD does 
not, in any case, specify the amount of salary to be paid.130 In the end, he 
considered the argument of violation of the principle of proportionality, 
which both Hungary and Poland called upon, unfounded, since it was 
necessary for the new Directive to protect workers’ rights and thus re-
store the disturbed balance.131 Given all the above, the AG recommended 
that the ECJ dismiss these actions in their entirety.132
4.2 National parliaments’ third yellow card
The challenge by Hungary and Poland is only the last line of defence 
against the 2018 PWD. While its adoption was still pending in 2016, the 
countries dissatisfi ed with the proposal felt that the Commission should 
either reject or amend the given proposal. In this regard, the yellow card 
procedure,133 the system established with the Lisbon Treaty, was used as 
the primary resistance mechanism.134
In order to explain the yellow card system, we must fi rst highlight 
one of the key principles of the EU − the principle of subsidiarity which 
is defi ned in TEU135 as well as in the Protocol on the application of the 
126 Hungary v European Parliament (n 119) para 1.
127 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 63/20 ‘Advocate General Sán-
chez-Bordona Proposes that the Court of Justice Should Dismiss the Actions for Annul-
ment Brought by Hungary and Poland against the Directive Strengthening Posted Workers’ 
Rights’ (2020) <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/
cp200063en.pdf> accessed 24 November 2020 1.
128 Hungary v European Parliament (n 119) para 2.
129 ECJ Press Release: AG Sánchez-Bordona Opinion (n 127) 2.
130 ibid.
131 Opinion of AG Sánchez-Bordona (n 122) para 108.
132 ECJ Press Release: AG Sánchez-Bordona Opinion (n 127) 2.
133 See: Tatjana Briški and Jelena piljak, ‘Indirect Inclusion of National Parliaments in the 
European Lawmaking Process: Croatian Parliament Priorities in European Affairs’ (2014) 7 
(1) Suvremene teme 7-28.
134 ‘Subsidiarity Control Mechanism’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/
law/law-making-process/adopting-eu-law/relations-national-parliaments/subsidiari-
ty-control-mechanism_hr> accessed 24 November 2020.
135 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ 326/13.
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principle of subsidiarity and proportionality.136 The principle stipulates 
that Member States have competence in non-explicit areas of the Union, 
but at the same time the principle opens the possibility for the EU to take 
over the regulation of a specifi c problem if the Member States cannot 
achieve the objectives of the action entirely or if this can be achieved with 
better results at the Union level.137 From this defi nition, we can identify 
the potential issues of dispute that can arise between national parlia-
ments and the European Union in relation to the competence to resolve 
a particular issue, as was the case with the adoption of this Directive.
For the sake of protecting Member States from potential violations 
of the subsidiarity principle, in 2009 the Treaty Protocol introduced the 
possibility of submitting ‘yellow cards’, defi ning them as a procedure 
under which national parliaments of EU Member States can object to a 
draft legislative act on the grounds of the previously mentioned principle 
of subsidiarity.138 They are part of an ‘early warning’ procedure in which 
any national parliament or any chamber of a national parliament can 
in eight weeks from the date when a draft legislative act was forwarded 
to it send to the Presidents of the EU Parliament, the Council or the EU 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in 
question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.139 After this, 
the institution that produced the objected draft may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw it, while giving reasons for that decision.140 Since 
their introduction, the yellow cards have only been used on three oc-
casions,141 one of them being against the proposal for a revision of the 
Directive on the posting of workers. The reason for its rare use is the 
fact that to set the process in motion the objection has to be raised by at 
least one-third of all votes of national parliaments, which is indeed very 
diffi cult.142
136 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union − Protocols 
− Protocol (2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality [2008] 
OJ C115/01.
137 TEU Art 5(3).
138 ‘Yellow Card Procedure’ (Eurofound, 27 November 2017) <www.eurofound.europa.eu/
observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/yellow-card-procedure> accessed 
24 November 2020.
139 ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ (2020) European Parliament facts sheets <www.europarl.
europa.eu/ftu/pdf/hr/FTU_1.2.2.pdf> accessed 24 November 2020 1.
140 ‘Yellow Card Procedure’ (n 138).
141 Two of which concern matters regarding employment and industrial relations.
142 ‘Subsidiarity Control Mechanism’ (n 134).
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4.2.1 National parliaments’ reasoned opinions and the responses of the 
European Commission
In 2016, Croatia was one of 11 countries whose parliament submit-
ted a reasoned opinion,143 also known as a yellow card.144 In its reasoned 
opinion, the Croatian Parliament − Sabor − highlighted four critical ob-
jections to the proposal for the revision of the 1996 PWD. The Committee 
on European Affairs of the Croatian Parliament highlighted a breach 
of Article 56 of the TFEU, arguing that ‘the proposal for a directive vio-
lates the freedom to provide services with the Union’, emphasising that 
‘labour costs are a legitimate element of competitiveness in the internal 
market’.145 The Republic of Croatia also fi rmly believed that proposing 
a revision of the 1996 PWD, while the process of the implementation of 
the 2014 ED was still going on, created overregulation and contributed 
to legal uncertainty for workers and employers.146 Lastly, the Committee 
concluded that this was ‘an unnecessary entry into the area of employer 
and trade union autonomy and that the issue of posted workers should 
be addressed through collective bargaining’.147 Given all the above, Cro-
atia’s parliament took the view that the proposal to amend the 1996 Di-
rective was contrary to Article 5 of Protocol no 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.148 
Once initiated, the yellow card procedure obliges the EU Com-
mission to reconsider the proposal.149 While reviewing the proposal for 
amendments to the PWD, the Commission considered all reasoned opin-
ions received from national parliaments, classifi ed them into four sets of 
conclusions and responded to each of them. 
143 The other countries, beside Croatia, were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
144 ‘Obrazloženo mišljenje o prijedlogu direktive Europskog parlamenta i Vije a o izmjeni 
Direktive 96/71/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vije a od 16. prosinca 1996. o upu ivanju 
radnika u okviru pružanja usluga COM (2016) 128’ [‘Reasoned opinion on the proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services COM (2016) 128’] (2016) Croa-
tian Parliament, European Affairs Committee <www.sabor.hr/sites/default/fi les/uploads/
inline-fi les/OM%20Hrvatski%20sabor%20COM%20%282016%29%20128%20%2810%29.




148 ‘Bilješka s meuparlamentarnog sastanka “Ciljana revizija pravila za upu ivanje radni-
ka”’ [‘Note from the inter-parliamentary meeting “Targeted revision of the rules for posting 
workers”’] (2016) Croatian Parliament, European Affairs Committee (document on fi le with 
the authors) 1.
149 ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ (n 139) 3.
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As a fi rst objection to the proposal, some of the national parliaments 
stated that the existing regulations were suffi cient and appropriate.150 
The background to this view is the fear of a possible reduction in compet-
itiveness, which the Croatian parliament also pointed out in its reasoned 
opinion, although this particular objection could not be a suffi ciently 
good reason to invoke a breach in the subsidiarity principle. The Com-
mission did not take this view into account, pointing out that: 
the objective of this proposal is to provide a more level playing fi eld be-
tween national and cross-border service providers and to ensure that 
workers carrying out work at the same location are protected by the 
same mandatory rules, irrespective of whether they are local worker or 
posted workers, in all sectors of the economy.151 
States have abused the possibility of whether or not to apply collec-
tive agreements in non-construction sectors and have thus consciously 
contributed to the creation of conditions in which posted workers were 
paid less than domestic workers. In order to truly reduce social dump-
ing, it was necessary to impose an obligation on States to extend the 
application of collective agreements to sectors other than construction.152
All national parliaments that initiated the yellow card procedure 
argued that the question at hand should be dealt with at the nation-
al level, adding that the Commission had not suffi ciently demonstrated 
that the issue should be handled at the Union level.153 The Commission 
denied the latter. This issue was further deepened when countries such 
as Spain, Portugal, France, the UK and Italy submitted their response, 
stating that the proposal did not violate the subsidiarity principle, and 
thus supported the Commission’s stances.154 The Commission consid-
ered that ‘individual measures could not achieve legal harmonisation in 
the internal market and clarity of the legal framework of posted workers 
equally effectively’.155
The Danish parliament also expressed concerns about a violation of 
the principle of subsidiarity. Denmark was the only high-wage country 
that joined the yellow card procedure. This country was worried that, 
unlike the 1996 PWD, the proposal for a new Directive did not explicit-
150 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the National Parliaments on the Proposal for a Directive amending the Posting of Workers 
Directive, with regard the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2’ (2017) 




154 Note from the inter-parliamentary meeting (n 148) 1.
155 Communication from the Commission (n 150) 7.
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ly state the competence of states to determine wages and conditions of 
employment.156 The Commission tried to appease their position of those 
submitting reasoned opinions, arguing that it was not about regulating 
remuneration and working conditions, but merely preventing discrimi-
nation between domestic and posted workers.157 
The yellow card procedure can be used to present an existing di-
vision between the ‘richer’ and the ‘poorer’ Member States of the EU, 
where, to maintain their competitiveness in the market, countries like 
Croatia fi led complaints that did not relate to a violation of the subsid-
iarity principle. At the same time, the views of the ‘richer’ countries that 
called for the prevention of social dumping were refl ected in the Commis-
sion’s responses in 2016. However, even the yellow card procedure, which 
at fi rst glance seemed like a dispute between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’, has 
also revealed different additional interests. Thus, arguments opposing 
intervention on the market were heard. Some generally opposed market 
regulation, and others, as in the case of Denmark, opposed EU interven-
tion in the Danish labour market.
The Commission, while reacting to all arguments in the reasoned 
opinions, remained in favour of the proposal, considering it was not in 
breach of the principle of subsidiarity or proportionality. The amended 
Directive was in the end adopted. The majority of countries that had 
started the yellow card procedure did not vote against the new Direc-
tive.158 Why many countries, including Croatia, changed their positions 
concerning what they had expressed in the yellow card procedure is not 
quite clear.
One argument might be that the position in the Council is infl u-
enced by what countries expect to happen in Parliament. The most 
prominent parliamentarian groups, EPP and S&D,159 supported the pro-
posal. Since the vote in Parliament predominantly supported the amend-
ed Directive,160 it would have been diffi cult for those opposed to the pro-
156 ibid, 7.
157 ibid, 7.  
158 Countries that voted against the amended Directive were Hungary and Poland, the 
countries that abstained were Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK, while the other 22 
countries voted in favour of the new Directive. See ‘Voting Results’ (Council of the European 
Union) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/corporate-policies/transparen-
cy/open-data/voting-results/?meeting=3625> accessed 24 November 2020.
159 European People’s Party and Socialists & Democrats.
160 The revised rules were approved by 456 votes to 147, with 46 abstentions; ‘Posting of 
Workers: Final Vote on Equal Pay and Working Conditions’ (News European Parliament, 29 
May 2018) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180524IPR04230/
posting-of-workers-fi nal-vote-on-equal-pay-and-working-conditions> accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2020.
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posal to ‘mobilise enough MEPs to block it’.161 By not having a majority 
in Parliament, the opponents of the 2018 PWD would have lost in that 
institution, and possibly also in the Council. This might be one of the 
reasons why they also changed their positions within the Council. Such 
political constraints might be part of the explanation. However, it is also 
possible that during the negotiation process, the states also realised that 
other arguments, and not only those regarding competitiveness, should 
be taken into consideration. In Croatia’s case, whereas all the arguments 
in the yellow card procedure refl ected the interests of the businesses that 
provided services across the border, the change in its position in voting 
for the Directive might have been motivated by the arguments put for-
ward by the trade unions.162 Therefore, divided interests at home might 
have made governments more cautious in simply rejecting the amended 
proposal. The following section discusses this divergence of interests and 
arguments within a country, taking Croatia as a case study.
4.3 The new posted workers Directive 
After protracted negotiations, elaborated above, the Revised Posted 
Workers Directive 2018163 was fi nally adopted.
As we have already explained the main features of the 1996 PWD, 
here we will pay attention only to the main changes introduced by the 
new Directive and which are relevant to our paper.
In its opening statements, the 2018 PWD states that ‘in a truly in-
tegrated and competitive internal market, undertakings compete on the 
basis of factors such as productivity, effi ciency, and the education and 
skill level of the labour force, as well as the quality of their goods and ser-
vices and the degree of innovation thereof’.164 In other words, enterprises 
should strive to compete in the EU market on bases that do not include 
the wages of workers. Below, we shall assess two points from the 2018 
PWD: remuneration and the duration of the posting.
161 Diane Fromage and Valentin Kreilinger, ‘National Parliaments’ Third Yellow Card and 
the Struggle over the Revisions of the Posted Workers Directive’ (2017) 10(1) European 
Journal of Legal Studies 125, 158.
162 The European Trade Union Confederation had written a letter to Commissioner Thyssen 
demanding that the ‘yellow card’ procedure be rejected. In addition, the General Secretary of 
the ETUC stated that ‘All trade unions in Europe, including countries where parliaments have 
supported the yellow card procedure, strongly support the revision of the Posting of Workers 
Directive’. See ‘No To the Yellow Card on Posted Workers’ (ETUC, 13 May 2016) <www.etuc.
org/en/pressrelease/no-yellow-card-posted-workers> accessed 24 November 2020.
163 Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services [2018] OJ L173/16.
164 Directive (EU) 2018/957 (n 162) Preamble, recital 16.
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4.3.1 Remuneration
When it comes to remuneration, the 2018 PWD would oblige employ-
ers to treat posted workers according to the same rules as local workers 
as set out by law or, if applicable, by a universally binding collective la-
bour agreement of the host country.165
Additionally, the same advantages, such as bonuses, allowances or 
pay increases according to seniority, and overtime rates, should also 
be offered.166 Unfortunately, the 2018 Directive leaves some uncertainty 
about sick pay, maternity pay, compensation for unfair dismissal, and 
redundancy pay, which we believe might cause future disputes.167 Be-
sides, the phrase ‘equal pay’ is still very vague and does not imply that 
a posted worker is entitled to an identical salary and a benefi ts package 
that his local colleagues might be entitled to, such as lunch allowances 
and a company car.168 Regardless of the remuneration, employers are 
obliged to separately reimburse travel and board and lodging expendi-
tures when workers are required to travel for professional reasons.169
4.3.2 Duration of the posting
Under the new provisions, a limit of 12 months of posting is intro-
duced, which can be extended to 18 months if the service provider gives 
an acceptable justifi cation. After these 18 months, the employment con-
ditions of the host Member State will apply to the posted worker if they 
are more favourable than the home Member State’s employment laws170 
This calculation of the period of stay is based on the cumulative stay of 
an individual worker. This added provision was a way of ensuring align-
ment with the rules on coordination of the social security systems171 and, 
at the same time, a means to fi ll the gaps left by the previous 1996 PWD 
where there was no clear interpretation of the words ‘limited period’ con-
cerning the duration of posting.172
165 Voss (n 108) 46.
166 ibid.
167 Paul Minderhoud, ‘Revised Posted Workers Directive: In the Service of Fair Labour Mo-
bility?’ (MoveS Seminar Croatia, Zagreb, 25 October 2019) 58.
168 ibid, 59.
169 ibid, 60.
170 Sara Fekete, ‘Revision of EU’s Posting of Workers Directive: Blessing or Curse to Busi-
ness?’ (Fragomen) <www.fragomen.com/insights/blog/revision-eus-posting-workers-direc-
tive-blessing-or-curse-business> accessed 24 November 2020.
171 Which limits the duration of stay under home social security to a maximum duration of 
24 months, which can be extended under the consent of home and host state. 
172 Fekete (n 170).
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Besides, it is essential to note that the 2018 PWD is entirely comple-
mentary to the 2014 ED as it mainly only addresses areas and problems 
that were not touched upon in 2014.173 With the revision of the PWD, we 
can further argue that while it made improvements that relate to the 
clarifi cation of certain areas of its original version (eg the defi nition of 
‘remuneration’), it introduces stricter requirements for all services pro-
viders active in transnational business, which may make it more diffi cult 
for cross-border transactions to take place.
5 Case study − Croatia
Since the 2018 PWD had to be implemented by July 2020,174 it is 
not possible as yet to predict the specifi c consequences that it will have 
on the competitiveness of the countries that launched the yellow card 
procedure. In order to better answer our hypotheses, the authors of this 
paper have decided to present and analyse, in the form of a case study, 
the anticipated impact of the 2018 PWD as per the views of the Union 
of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia and the Croatian Employers’ 
Association. The interviews were conducted with Agata Daj i  (member 
of BusinessEurope and the Croatian Employers’ Association) and Ana 
Mili evi  Pezelj and Sun ica Brnardi  (representatives of UATUC).175 
The aforementioned institutions were selected because of their fa-
miliarity with the subject matter of the Directive and their role in the 
yellow card procedure, where their views were of great importance in 
forming a reasoned opinion of the Croatian parliament.176 They also re-
fl ect opposing interests − on the one hand, there is a need to improve 
the socio-economic status of posted workers (represented by the unions), 
and on the other hand to fi ght against the loss of competitiveness which 
results in a decrease in work (the Employers’ Association). Additionally, 
the differences in their views on the 2018 PWD indicate that the divide 
goes much deeper than the apparent rift between the yellow card ini-
tiators and the countries that initiated the Directive. In other words, a 
division is formed inside states as well.
173 Voss (n 108) 46.
174 Directive (EU) 2018/957, Art 3.
175 During the interviews with the representatives of the institutions mentioned above, a 
semi-structured interview method was used where the respondents were asked to provide 
answers to pre-set open-ended questions.
176 We also attempted to reach the Croatian representatives of the EU Economic and Social 
Committee, but did not receive a response to our correspondence.
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5.1 Croatian Employers’ Association − ‘The issue of posted 
workers should be regulated by the market’
The Association was founded in 1993 in order to protect and pro-
mote the rights and interest of its members.177 From its beginnings, it 
has been a member of BusinessEurope178 and has worked with other 
prominent international organisations such as the ILO179 and IOE.180 
Moreover, the Employers’ Association has participated in the work of the 
EU’s consultative body, the EESC, which is composed of employers, em-
ployees and representatives of various interest groups.181 
The Croatian Employers’ Association was selected as the fi rst sub-
ject of the analysis as there was congruence between their point of view 
and the opinion of the Croatian parliament. The Croatian Employers’ 
Association and the Croatian parliament both emphasised that the issue 
of reduced competitiveness was the central issue of this Directive and 
that its implementation would further hamper the position of Croatian 
companies in the European market.182
The Croatian Employers’ Association183 expects that the additional 
cost, as a result of the equalisation of the gross wages of domestic work-
ers and posted workers in the same posts, would be a leading cause 
of the reduction of competitiveness of Croatian service providers.184 
The need for future contributions to be calculated from the gross wage 
earned abroad would signifi cantly increase the cost of the posted work-
er and reduce the employer’s profi t to such an extent that it would be 
unprofi table for the employer to continue to post workers or to apply for 
tenders. These arguments are backed up by an example of calculations 
of the accounting and counselling company from Germany prepared for 
the Tehnomont Shipyard Pula on 22 April 2016.185 Based on this calcu-
177 ‘About Us’ (HUP) <www.hup.hr/en/about-us.aspx> accessed 27 November 2020.
178 ‘BusinessEurope’ (HUP) <www.hup.hr/en/businesseurope.aspx> accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2020.
179 ‘International Labour Organisation (ILO)’ (HUP) <www.hup.hr/en/international-la-
bour-organisation-ilo-and-international-labour-conference-ilc.aspx> accessed 27 Novem-
ber 2020.
180 ‘The International Organisation of Employers (IOE)’ (HUP) <www.hup.hr/en/the-inter-
national-organisation-of-employers-ioe.aspx> accessed 27 November 2020.
181 ‘European Economic and Social Committee (EGSO)’ (HUP) <www.hup.hr/en/interna-
tional-affaris.aspx> accessed 27 November 2020.
182 See (n 144).
183 Interview with Agata DajËiÊ, Croatian Employers’ Association and BusinessEurope rep-
resentative (Zagreb, Croatia, 27 February 2020).
184 Directive (EU) 2018/957, Preamble recital 18.
185 ‘Anketa za tvrtke − procjena uËinaka u sluËaju provedbe ciljane revizije Direktive o iza-
slanim radnicima 96/71/EZ EP (gubitka vrijednosti posla i broja radnih mjesta)’ [‘Survey 
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lation, it is shown that the average cost per worker would increase from 
EUR 1,000 to EUR 1,500 per worker per month. Given that Tehnomont 
Shipyard sends 250 workers to Germany, there would be an increase 
in costs of approximately EUR 3 to 4 million each year, which would 
cause the closure of its operations in Germany. The only solution to the 
increased costs would be to increase the prices of services offered by the 
Croatian employers in foreign countries. As a result, Croatian competi-
tiveness would be reduced as the companies would lose the advantage of 
obtaining jobs on account of cheaper labour and would face the practice 
of jobs going more frequently to domestic workers.186 
Although the previously mentioned example of the shipyard indicates 
the danger of the complete termination of the posting of workers from 
the Republic of Croatia in the future, the Employers’ Association believes 
that, due to the tradition of doing business in foreign countries and proper 
preparation, larger companies would still be able to continue to provide 
their services. Smaller companies are the ones that would face the big-
gest problems, which, in the opinion of the authors, could have negative 
impacts, such as layoffs or even the collapse of the company as a whole.
Another question that arose during our interviews was the situation 
with companies in the countries that were the initiators of the 2018 PWD, 
those that receive the largest number of posted workers and those that 
sought, through this Directive, to reduce the problem of social dumping. 
Our interviewee points out that the Directive will have a negative impact 
on large foreign companies that have been interested in posting due to 
a lack of workforce.187 They may be forced to relocate their production 
to areas where they would be able to fi nd cheaper labour if posting be-
comes unprofi table.188 The sole benefi ciaries of the whole situation would 
be small and medium-sized enterprises in the recipient countries. Posting 
was not very important to them because of the small number of work-
ers they need and the negligible differences in the costs of labour, since 
these were less profi table jobs. It is precisely these companies that could 
attract workers from poorer countries and recruit them permanently if 
the predicted reductions in the numbers of posted workers prove correct 
in the future.189 This means, according to our interviewee, that small and 
for Companies − Impact Assessment in the Case of the Targeted Revision of the Directive 
on Posted Workers 96/71/EC EP (Loss of Value and Number of Jobs)’] (2016) Tehnomont 
shipyard Pula d. o. o. (document on fi le with the authors).
186 Interview with Agata DajËiÊ, Croatian Employers’ Association and BusinessEurope rep-
resentative (Zagreb, Croatia, 27 February 2020).
187 ibid.
188 The Association’s representative was referring to non-European countries.
189 Interview with Agata DajËiÊ, Croatian Employers’ Association and BusinessEurope rep-
resentative (Zagreb, Croatia, 27 February 2020).
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medium businesses might employ foreign workers if the reduction in the 
numbers of posting means that they cannot fi nd jobs as posted workers. 
Finally, the Croatian Employers’ Association considers that the Direc-
tive was adopted to favour wealthier countries rather than to address social 
dumping. Reducing the ability of employers to continue posting workers 
will lead to higher numbers of departures of ‘our’190 workers to countries 
with higher social status and their permanent employment in foreign com-
panies. Therefore, the solution to the regulation of posted workers should, 
according to the Employers’ Association, be left to the market and in line 
with the 1996 PWD, which, in its opinion, regulated this matter thorough-
ly. Due to the mobility of workers inside the European Union,191 Croatian 
employers would still be forced to raise the wages of their workers without 
this Directive to retain them. This would increase the standard of living of 
workers without compromising competitiveness.192
5.2 The Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia − ‘The 
question of posted workers should be viewed from the point of 
view of society, not of the individual’ 
The Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia is an indepen-
dent and voluntary interest organisation founded in 1990193 It consists of 
20 unions and a total of 99,682 members,194 making it one of the most 
prestigious associations in the country. Much like the Employers’ Associ-
ation, the trade unions have worked alongside prominent groups such as 
the EESC.195 One of its projects, most crucial to the issue of posting, is a 
specialised advisory offi ce for the rights of posted workers, where these 
workers can come and receive information about the rights granted to 
them by the Posted Workers Directives.196 
Unlike the Croatian Employers’ Association, the representatives 
of UATUC did not agree with the reasoned opinion sent by the Croa-
tian parliament in the yellow card procedure.197 The representatives of 
190 The Association’s representative was referring to Croatian workers.
191 Which has become rather simpler for Croatians since joining the EU in 2013.
192 Interview with Agata DajËiÊ, Croatian Employers’ Association and BusinessEurope rep-
resentative (Zagreb, Croatia, 27 February 2020).
193 ‘About Us’ (SSSH) <www.sssh.hr/en/static/uatuc-1> accessed 27 November 2020.
194 ibid.
195 ‘EESC Info’ (SSSH) < www.sssh.hr/hr/vise/0-0/egso-info-787> accessed 24 November 2020.
196 ‘Pravno savjetovalište za upuÊene radnike’ (SSSH) <www.sssh.hr/hr/static/podruc-
ja-rada/radno-pravo/pravno-savjetovaliste-za-upucene-radnike-100> accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2020.
197 Interview with Ana MiliËeviÊ Pezelj and SunËica BrnardiÊ, representatives of UATUC 
(Zagreb, Croatia, 6 March 2020).
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UATUC are of the opinion that the parliament does not fully understand 
the wage discrimination issue and social dumping and that by initiating 
the yellow card procedure, parliament diminishes the signifi cance of the 
problem.
Its argumentation is based on the complaints received (mostly 
from workers in the construction sector), as well as seeing the practice 
of posted workers so far, as a ground for exploiting and circumventing 
the rules. According to the UATUC representatives, in the current situ-
ation, only temporary work agencies and so-called letterbox companies, 
set up to circumvent social security, collective agreements and taxes, 
are profi ting.198 This allows employers to seek less for the same job and 
thus become more competitive in the foreign market. It is because of this 
practice that the countries of ‘Eastern Europe’, including the Republic 
of Croatia, contribute to social dumping within the European Union. 
Although countries like Croatia contribute to social dumping, they state 
that this problem arose long before Croatia’s accession to the EU and 
that the accession of low-income countries only further intensifi ed the 
pay gap among workers who do the same job.
Furthermore, the representatives of UATUC consider that Croatia 
has neglected that the Directive also protects its workers from lower la-
bour costs caused by the arrival of workers from EU countries with a 
lower standard of living than Croatia’s.199 They notice positive sides to 
the protection of Croatian workers against unfair competition, but point 
out that a new problem is opening up which is the growing employment 
of third-country nationals where quota numbers are set This Directive 
does not regulate the employment of these workers.
One of the positive consequences of the 2018 PWD, when it is im-
plemented, might perhaps be the increase in workers’ effi ciency due to 
better working conditions and higher wages.200 This statement is based 
on research conducted in 2018 on the primary motivators for employ-
ee satisfaction, where workers’ wages and income security are cited as 
one of the critical points for greater motivation and therefore for better 
198 See ‘Europski parlament za pravedne uvjete upuÊivanja radnika’ [‘European Parliament 
on Fair Conditions for Posting Workers’] (SSSH) <www.sssh.hr/hr/vise/aktivnosti-75/eu-
ropski-parlament-za-pravedne-uvjete-upucivanja-radnika-3462> accessed 24 November 
2020.
199 ‘Rastu duplo brže od nas: Hrvatsku bi po visini plaÊa uskoro mogle prestiÊi Rumunjska 
i Bugarska’ (Poslovni.hr, 29 April 2020) <www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/hrvatsku-bi-po-visi-
ni-placa-uskoro-mogle-prestici-sve-srednjoeuropske-zemlje-352598> accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2020.
200 Interview with Ana MiliËeviÊ Pezelj and SunËica BrnardiÊ, UATUC representatives (Za-
greb, Croatia, 6 March 2020).
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results.201 However, the worker is not the only one responsible for the 
effi ciency and organisation of the work, as management roles are a vital 
component contributing to the overall work environment and effi cien-
cy.202 Countries like Norway, where the society’s value system is different 
and where employers are proud of social equity in payment within the 
community, as well as the ability of all to live off their work, is cited as a 
positive model.203
Finally, our interviewees referred to the opinion concerning reduced 
competitiveness, as a central position of the Employers’ Association. They 
point out that the new, amended Directive has positive aspects for em-
ployers as well, such as the fact that it will help those who comply with 
the rules and do not violate workers’ rights and that non-compliant com-
panies that pose unfair competition will have to operate under the same 
rules imposed by the 2018 PWD. Therefore, the provisions of this Directive 
will contribute to the more transparent and better-performing business of 
compliant employers. As a solution to increased labour costs caused by the 
Directive, they emphasise the role of the state in the issue of posted work-
ers. The Republic of Croatia should provide access to cheaper fi nancial 
resources for employers and provide incentives to ensure their liquidity 
and prevent layoffs. With the help of the state, as an underlying condition 
for competitiveness, it is necessary to achieve more effi cient public admin-
istration and better digitalisation of the whole workers’ posting system.204
At the end of their review of the 2018 PWD, they pointed out that 
reliance on the market model of regulation is not reasonable as it is pre-
cisely this model of regulation that has led to the problems encountered 
by workers and that it is crucial to look at this issue from the point of 
view of society and to raise the quality of life of workers. They see the 
solution in a bipartite model in which unions, alongside employers, will 
help regulate this issue.
5.3 Case study analysis
Following the interviews with the representatives of the Employers’ 
Association and UATUC, the authors conclude that the 2018 PWD has 
caused wide divisions within the Republic of Croatia. The views of both 
sides are products of their thorough analysis and indicate the complexity 
201 Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia, ‘Rad po mjeri Ëovjeka’ (2018) <www.sssh.
hr/upload_data/site_fi les/rad-po-mjeri_brosura.pdf> accessed 24 November 2020.
202 Interview with Ana MiliËeviÊ Pezelj and SunËica BrnardiÊ, UATUC representatives (Za-
greb, Croatia, 6 March 2020).
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of the issue of regulating posted workers. As a fundamental argument, 
the Croatian Employers’ Association points out that countries such as 
Croatia will lose competitiveness in the EU market due to the adoption of 
this Directive. However, a loss of competitiveness of the ‘poorer’ countries 
could also become a problem for the European Union itself. The work 
of two authors, F De Wispelaere and J Pacolet, who have analysed the 
economic importance of posted workers in the EU based on statistical 
data collected from the Member States, will serve to explain this claim.205 
According to De Wispelaere and Pacolet, one of the benefi ts of posting is 
its impact on the free movement of labour within the EU. They state that 
in 2014 there were 1.45 million A1 permits issued for posted workers 
and that the number is increasing each year.206 Luxembourg207 is given 
as one of the examples where the number of posted workers is as high 
as 20.7%, or Belgium208 where 30% of all employees in the construction 
sector are posted workers. 
Furthermore, they emphasise the importance of posting in stimu-
lating intra-EU competitiveness as well as in increasing the household 
income of posted workers. The increase in income is due to the vast 
difference in the minimum wage among the EU countries. Even the ob-
ligation for employers to pay minimum wages in the countries where the 
workers are posted209 often results in the fact that the workers earn more 
than an average wage210 in their sending country.211 This means that 
even when receiving a minimum wage, there is still an increase in living 
standards for posted workers since their home country’s average wage is 
most likely to be much lower. 
All of the stated benefi ts for the receiving countries as well as for 
the sending countries could be jeopardised by the increase in costs for 
employers from the sending countries. Therefore, according to De Wispe-
laere and Pacolet, it is crucial to determine whether the 2018 PWD will 
cause a loss of competitiveness. The most crucial aspects that have an 
impact on the ability of employers from poorer countries to offer their 
services at a lower cost and as such to be competitive in the market are 
the amount of taxes they pay in their home country, the amount of social 
security contributions paid by employers, and gross wages.212 In gener-
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al, social security contributions and income taxes213 are lower in most 
sending countries than in the recipient countries.214 Therefore, although 
the obligation of Croatian employers to pay the minimum gross wage of 
the recipient country would cause a substantial increase in the cost of 
labour, they could still offer their services more cheaply.
Nevertheless, our opinion aligns with that of Croatia’s UATUC, in 
which commercial gain should not be obtained by curtailing workers’ 
rights. Given the research conducted by J Cremers on good practices 
conducted by countries to maintain a fraud-free environment, we believe 
that cooperation between the Member States might help in implement-
ing the rules set out by the recent 2018 PWD and in this way diminish 
fraudulent behaviour and at the same time guarantee working rights. 
Some of these good practices are the use of e-government, as well as the 
use of different databases through data sharing, matching or mining, 
strengthening of the labour inspectorate and requirements for identity 
cards for all workers on construction sites.215 Furthermore, a universal, 
EU-wide monitoring system could lower the burden on fi rms and also 
reduce the problems of differential treatment in the Member States.216
As a conclusion to this case study analysis, the authors of this pa-
per believe that the changes introduced by this Directive will have a dual 
effect. On the one hand, the socio-economic status and rights of workers 
will be improved. In contrast, in countries such as Croatia, fewer workers 
will be posted due to the increased costs that will cause some employers 
to become unprofi table, which confi rms the second hypothesis of this 
paper that the increase in regulation will decrease the number of posted 
workers.
6 Conclusion 
During the revision of the 1996 PWD, the Commission highlighted 
that the old legislation ‘no longer replies to new realities within the single 
market, namely the growth in wage differentials that create unwant-
ed incentives to use posting as a means for unfair competition’.217 This 
statement is connected to the fact that in the year the original PWD was 
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adopted there were only 15 Member States.218 As of February 2020, there 
are 27 Member States that make up the European Union.219 Even if we 
only address the changing number of Member States, we can agree that 
the single market in the mid-1990s is quite different from the situation 
existing in today’s market, which means that a revision of the 1996 PWD 
was necessary to adapt the previous regulations to the changing single 
market. 
That said, after a thorough analysis of the issue of posted workers, 
we believe that the question of whether or not the 2018 PWD will improve 
the posting of workers is clearly not black or white. Rather, it is a very 
complex issue that goes much deeper than the surface divide between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States or ‘richer’ and ‘poorer’ EU countries. Using 
a case study method, we have shown that the division is mostly based 
on the difference of interests that exist within each country. These in-
terests are in the legislative process often articulated as ideological be-
liefs of higher or lesser public intervention in the market. This forms a 
confl ict inside each country between those who believe the state (or the 
EU) should limit the amount of intervention it could have on the market 
and those who believe the opposite. Therefore, proving our primary hy-
pothesis, the posted workers dispute is much more complicated than the 
opposition between ‘richer’ and the ‘poorer’ European countries. 
The same arguments remain in assessing the relevance of the new 
2018 PWD. As these arguments are partly ideological, the infl uence of 
the new, amended Directive cannot be evaluated neutrally but is ideology 
dependent. Those who are against market intervention will see it as a 
problem. In contrast, those who believe that the protection of individual 
worker’s interests requires public intervention in the market will see it 
more positively.
It is still early to predict the real infl uence of the new legislation on 
the internal market, given that the implementation period only expired in 
July 2020. However, based on the presented predictions, we can expect a 
rise in costs for companies engaged in the posting of workers, making it 
unprofi table for some fi rms who have based their earnings on being able 
to post low-income workers to other ‘richer’ Member States to remain in 
this market. This may result in a reduction of posted workers overall. 
One of the objectives of the internal market is to increase cross-border 
movements. Therefore, the new legislation might end up having conse-
quences that are contrary to the goals of the internal market. There are, 
consequently, already indications that our secondary hypothesis might 
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prove correct. This can, in turn, raise concerns about the legitimacy of 
the new legislation from the point of view of the EU internal market pol-
icy. In principle, the EU has competence only to pursue those measures 
that enhance the functioning of the internal market.220 As the new Direc-
tive might go in a different direction, this may lead to the conclusion that 
the EU is no longer just a market-building project, but instead a social 
project as well. These might be the ‘new realities of the single market’ of 
which the Commission spoke in the statement we reproduced at the be-
ginning of this concluding section. Therefore, the balance between mar-
ket enhancing measures and the protection of social interests might be 
different in the current EU than at the time of the Laval judgment. If so, 
even if the new legislation leads to a decrease in the movement of posted 
workers, it might still be seen as legitimate, as it balances between the 
two goals of the EU integration process − building an internal market, 
but also caring for a social Europe. 
Besides, we can assume that countries that have been most opposed 
to the new Directive will also have the greatest problems in implementing 
it. As several studies show,221 areas such as food regulation, transport reg-
ulation and social policy regulation have ‘a lot of confl icting interests and, 
therefore, potential resistance in implementation.222 Resistance in imple-
mentation from opposing forces usually leads to a delay in the implemen-
tation of a directive.223 This time, delay, we believe, can be anticipated in 
Croatia as well as in other countries that have participated in the yellow 
card procedure. Consequently, the analysis of the posted workers issue 
shows us the timeless confl ict between workers’ rights and business com-
petitiveness, which can best be summed up with the phrase ‘one person’s 
social dumping is another’s competitive advantage’.224
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